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Introduction 
The five-chapter dissertation that is common in the field 
of education is a product of a largely unquestioned set of 
assumptions about how research should be done and what 
it should look like. It is a product that is bolstered by a 
whole set of institutional procedures and requirements 
that have become somewhat routine in many schools of 
education—research courses, doctoral committees, and 
institutional review boards are all part of the vetting process. 
The five-chapter format is not a recent innovation. Its roots 
lie in classical rhetoric where it arose as an organizing 
heuristic in expository compositions, originally in speeches 
and persuasive discourse. Its obvious utility is borne out by 
the fact that some version or other of the heuristic is used 
as the authorized formal guide to composing dissertations 
in colleges of education and in social science departments 
nationally and internationally. However, we wish to question 
the value of the heuristic and some of its assumptions for 
modes of research that are becoming popular as more and 
more practitioners are engaging in research on their own 
practice (Jarvis 1999). 
The conversation that initiated this paper focused on 
issues of confidentiality and rigor. We work with students 
in a doctoral-level, professional practice program in which 
many of our students are principals and educational 
leaders who aim to conduct practitioner projects, and 
their “dissertations” are therefore focused on dealing with 
problems of practice at their own institutions. This means 
that their attempts to maintain institutional anonymity not 
only seem impractical and impossible (in the small state of 
Hawai‘i), but also a violation of the very idea of practitioner 
research. Can they be both practitioner and researcher? We 
view this dichotomy as problematic—not just because it is 
a version of the theory-practice dichotomy in which the 
practitioner is denied the role of legitimate inquirer, but also 
because it depicts the researcher unrealistically as a sort of 
non-practitioner. 
In addition, conversations about rigor were part of 
the early and ongoing discussions about our new doctoral 
program in professional educational practice, and as we 
approached the dissertation stage the question of the 
nature of rigor loomed large. Standards of rigor, validity, 
and verifiability are codified in textbooks and the rules 
of confidentiality that are rightfully demanded by human 
studies committees, but they feel somehow inappropriate in 
this new setting. 
We wondered if there might be different measures 
of rigor, not only as they apply to the “dissertation as 
product” but also to the “dissertation as process” and to 
the dissertation as part of our collective conversation about 
the “rigor” of the program. We found ourselves talking 
about the product using cumbersome language like “the 
paper that we are calling a dissertation” or “the dissertation 
in professional practice” for want of better terms. We 
envisioned something different—a more holistic model that 
did not separate theory from practice, process from product, 
or the researcher from the research. 
Indeed, it seemed to us that the integrity of the whole 
is dependent on the artful integration of the parts. We 
believe that a better approach lies in overcoming the 
pernicious dualism between researcher and practitioner and 
in reconstructing the idea of the practitioner- inquirer as 
an artist. Our efforts in this work directed us to Dewey’s 
aesthetics. In this paper, we take a look at practitioner-
research from the perspective of Deweyan aesthetics, 
drawing on the work of Elliot Eisner (1998), Donald Schön 
(1983), and others to help us rethink ideas of confidentiality, 
rigor, and the role of the dissertation. 
Acknowledging Context
As a prelude to the discussion, we need to say a bit more 
about the context in which our questions and concerns arose. 
By the time the twenty-eight cohort members embarked on 
their individual inquiries, they had already completed group 
consultancy projects in public and independent schools in 
the state—a project based on a similar one pioneered by 
Peabody College at Vanderbilt University. These consultancy 
projects entailed two semesters of research and writing 
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and a substantial report that the students presented to 
teachers and administrators in the schools where they 
did their studies. Thus, the dissertation in practice did 
not constitute what is traditionally viewed as a “capstone” 
project, but one of two major program projects. 
The impetus to rethink and reconfigure the 
traditional education dissertation format grew naturally 
out of the special nature of practitioner research, but 
it was also nurtured by the unique context of Hawai‘i. 
Many educators in Hawai‘i, especially Indigenous 
educators, are concerned about current educational 
practices and suspicious of imposed models of research 
that are neither congruent with, nor respectful of, 
Indigenous knowledge. 
The idea of artistry, then, that we discuss in this 
paper arises from the epistemological encounters that 
were inherent in our work in the EdD program. These 
encounters demanded a critical, ref lexive approach that 
took into account the aesthetic and spiritual dimensions 
of human experience. As one of our Indigenous cohort 
members notes in her work, “While this study is being 
conducted to fulfill degree requirement of an American 
institution, I hope to honor my Indigenous heritage 
by adapting traditional western academic constructs 
in ways that are compatible with and supportive of my 
Indigenous values; ways that lead to achievement of 
Indigenous educational aspirations” (Hattori 2014, 11). 
Her view is informed by current educational scholarship 
in Hawai‘i and the Pacific region that is influenced by 
Indigenous epistemology and perspectives. Close to half 
of the members of that first cohort identified as Native 
Hawaiian or Pacific Islander and sought inspiration in 
the work of scholars like Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1999), 
who call into question colonizing methodologies found 
in western scholarship about native peoples. Her work 
invites us to consider approaches that are more respectful 
and more in tune with Indigenous sensibilities. We 
tried to avoid the natural duality that this dilemma 
presented and let our conversations ref lect the tensions 
among different approaches and contrasting views. By 
acknowledging the complexity of our task, encouraging 
a critical informed approach, opening the space to ways 
of knowing that were more intuitive and non-linear, we 
sought to re-conceptualize the notion of inquiry and 
approach it through the lens of artistry. 
The Problems of the Research/Practitioner 
Dichotomy 
The view that research and practice are distinct endeavors 
is one that is deeply entrenched in academia, in spite of 
efforts to challenge its dominance (Schön 1983). In the 
received opinion, the aim of the researcher is to discover or 
reveal truths about the world; the role of the practitioner 
is to apply the discoveries of the researcher in the field of 
practical affairs. Donald Schön refers to this dominant view 
as the technical rational model—a view that underwrites 
a strict division of labor between knowers and doers. 
His work recounts the 300-year history of the technical 
rational model that culminates in the neo-positivism of 
the mid-nineteenth century. But positivism has all but 
vanished as an acceptable account of science. Wittgenstein 
(1964), for example, points to our “craving for generality…
our preoccupation with the method of science…(and) 
the contemptuous attitude towards the particular case” 
(18). Lakatos and Musgrave (1970), Popper (1935), and 
Feyerabend (1975) have all argued for a conception of 
scientific understanding that is not limited to a narrow 
conception of method, but views science more broadly as 
an art. Nevertheless, positivism as an ideology is especially 
prevalent among researchers in education and in the 
social sciences, including those who might disclaim any 
allegiance to positivism, and presents a persistent threat to 
the idea of practitioner inquiry. Among the most potent 
of positivist convictions is the belief in the exclusivity of 
the researcher—one consistent with the higher status of 
the researcher as knower over the practitioner as doer. For 
those who embrace this mindset, the idea of practitioner 
research is an oxymoron, and even if they are willing to 
admit that practitioners can inquire into their practice, they 
are inclined to view it as a very low level of inquiry that does 
not aim for the growth of knowledge but seeks, merely, to 
find out what works. 
We believe that this is a false dichotomy that should 
be laid to rest once and for all. First, research, if it is to 
be understood as methodical inquiry, is not exclusively 
the work of academic researchers. We all inquire with 
varying degrees of skill and insight, and for a variety of 
purposes. Secondly, the idea of driving a wedge between 
researcher and practitioner, knower and doer is a distortion 
that ignores the roles of the researcher as a doer and the 
practitioner as a knower. 
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One of the arguments that seeks to support the 
exclusivity of the researcher as knower is the claim of 
methodological expertise—a claim that the activity 
of research can be understood exclusively in terms of 
methodological procedures. But this view of science 
as method has been refuted by recent philosophers 
of science. Thinkers like Kuhn (1962), Lakatos and 
Musgrave (1970), and Feyerabend (1975) have adopted 
a more historical and developmental approach to 
understanding the nature of science and have questioned 
the idea of science defined in terms purely of uniform 
procedures. “Successful research does not obey general 
standards; it relies now on one trick, now on another; 
the moves that advance it and standards that define what 
counts as an advance are not always known to the movers” 
(Feyerabend 1975, xix). If the idea of uniform procedures 
in scientific endeavors is suspect, then it would be even 
more suspect when approved methods in the physical 
sciences are taken to be authoritative in human studies, 
and yet again, even more so in understanding the nature 
of practical inquiry. 
However, in spite of these criticisms, a sort of 
methodological fundamentalism or methodolatry is 
evoked in which the prestige of the researcher is upheld 
in virtue of their expertise purely as methodologists. 
Methodolatry may be understood as the view that the 
application of approved methods is the distinctive and 
defining attribute of research, and that the work of 
the researcher should be given purely in terms of the 
application of uniform procedures. So much for the role 
of conjecture, imagination, prior experience, situational 
knowledge, and other practical skills. Paul Feyerabend 
has attacked this view of uniform procedures arguing 
that we should understand science as an anarchic process 
rather than a rational, rule governed activity. Dewey 
(1934) also points to the importance of practical expertise 
in the capacity of the practitioner to formulate solutions 
to problems. Dewey invites us to ref lect on the case of 
the physician, whose practice demands knowledge of 
established standards. “But,” he points out, “cases are like, 
not identical. To be used intelligently, existing practices, 
however authorized they may be, have to be adapted to 
the exigencies of particular cases... the physician’s own 
personal attitudes, his own ways (individual methods) of 
dealing with the situation in which he is concerned, are 
not subordinated to the general principles of procedure, but 
are facilitated and directed by the latter” (171). 
From the perspective of practitioners, then, the idea 
that their work is held to be dependent on the work of the 
theoretician— Schön’s “technical rationality” —ignores the 
important role of practitioners as problem solvers. Indeed, 
it is often the case that it is the scientist and theoretician 
who is dependent on the practitioner for insights into the 
workings of nature.
Are we to understand that practitioners must await 
the orders of researchers before they act? Jarvis (1999) 
reminds us that practitioners are often knowers long before 
researchers happen along. And Feyerabend (1975) similarly 
observes that “Chinese Technology for a long time lacked 
any Western scientific underpinning and yet it was far 
ahead of contemporary Western technology” (xxi). Dewey 
(1916) reminds us, too, that “the sciences grew gradually out 
from useful social occupations” (201). How are we, then, to 
understand how practical knowledge arises? Not just by trial 
and error, surely; but from systematic inquiry into practice. 
These observations serve to remind us that science is 
often the handmaid of practitioners, seeking to justify and 
explain what is has already been established in practice 
for years. Experienced and sagacious scientists frequently 
seek out practitioners and their knowledge of practice in 
order to inform their studies. This would not be the case if 
practitioners were regarded as lacking knowledge.
Jarvis (1999) writes that practitioners must play two 
roles, that of researcher and practitioner; but his two-role 
position maintains the researcher/practitioner division. It 
also complicates the ethical dilemma posed at the beginning 
of this paper about preserving anonymity. The rules and 
duties of researcher and practitioner are set up so that they 
collide. The two-role approach also poses problems about 
rigor when standards of research practice are applied in 
different situations. Is it an error to apply standards of rigor 
in the field of, say, physics to human studies? Aristotle 
famously wrote in his Ethics that “it is a mark of an 
educated person to look in each area for only that degree of 
accuracy that the nature of the subject permits” (2000, 4). 
Our approach is to argue for a more diverse conception 
of inquiry and of associated conceptions of rigor—an 
approach that is more cognizant of the particular nature of 
individual cases, of local knowledge, and of the importance 
of insider knowledge.
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Artistry in Practice 
In opposition to the technical rational model with its 
dualistic conception of research and practice, theorists like 
Donald Schön and Eliot Eisner have proposed a different 
approach that views the practitioner as an artist rather than 
a strict methodologist. 
But what does it mean to compare the work of the 
teacher and other educational practitioners to that of the 
artist? One must take care not to set up a further dichotomy 
between practitioner and artist. We find that the same 
kind of dualistic thinking that separates research and 
practice applies in popular conceptions of art, and this 
viewpoint is supported by a number of influential writings 
in aesthetics. Collingwood (1958), for example, draws a 
strict line between art as a fine art and art as a craft. Dewey 
is critical of this approach. The target of Dewey’s criticism 
of traditional aesthetics is what he refers to as the “museum 
conception” of art. This is the view of art that exalts the 
art object as something that possesses an almost magical or 
spiritual quality and venerates the artist as someone with 
special status—as the possessor of preternatural sensitivities 
and gifts of creative expression, someone for whom the 
normal rules do not apply. The problem with this view is 
that it places art outside of the range of normal human 
activities and creates a disconnection between art and 
common experience. Dewey’s view, on the other hand, does 
not exaggerate the differences between art and practice, but 
emphasizes their similarities. 
Central to Dewey’s (1934) conception of art as it is 
experienced is the concept of an experience. Not all experi-
ence develops into an experience—only those experiences 
that “stand out from the f low of experience” and take on 
a personal, emotional, and intellectual significance and 
importance so that “each moment has significance in terms 
of the whole” (44). Dewey refers to two kinds of experience 
at this point: an intellectual experience (or experience 
of thinking) and a practical experience or experience of 
doing or making. Both thought and action may be said to 
involve aesthetic qualities in that they possess “a satisfying 
emotional quality because...of internal integration and ful-
fillment reached through ordered and organized movement” 
(45). That is, they possess artistic potential. 
Of course a great deal of human activity is experienced 
at a level that never achieves artistic integration, even at the 
most basic level of what could be considered art. Dewey 
refers to these as “non-aesthetic experiences.” Actions are 
performed out of duty. They are banal or repetitive and 
carried out in a sort of mechanical and thoughtless way. 
“In much of our experience we are not concerned with the 
connection of one incident with what went before and what 
comes after” (46). “There is experience, but so slack and 
discursive that it is not an experience (47). Such experiences 
exist between two poles: loose discursive, humdrum experi-
ences and constrained, mechanical, coerced experiences. 
Certain preconditions are required if the work of 
practitioners is to be practiced as an art. First, there is a 
spirit of personal engagement in the work: “The ideal of 
interest is exemplified in the artistic attitude” (Dewey 1916, 
142). Practitioners are almost by definition required to be 
interested in their work. They cannot adopt the dispassion-
ate perspective required of the researcher. 
The very word art may become associated not with 
specific transformations of things, making them more 
significant for mind, but with simulations of eccentric 
fancy and with emotional indulgences. The separa-
tion and mutual contempt for the ‘practical’ man and 
the man of theory or culture, the divorce of the fine 
and industrial arts, are indications of this situation. 
(Dewey 1916, 143) 
Artistry requires a “full and free interest” in one’s work. 
Fullness of interest refers to the intimacy of the insider 
viewpoint— the kind of detailed understanding that comes 
with familiarity of a particular situation or activity— the 
situational awareness of what is often referred to, disparag-
ingly, as the “subjective point of view.” Free interests 
introduce the conditions and nature of communities that 
enable artistry to f lourish—non-restrictive social conditions 
that allow people to explore alternative viewpoints and 
encourage experimentation. When these preconditions 
apply, then, the work of the artist may proceed unimpeded. 
In Art as Experience, Dewey refers to the initial 
requirement of artistic activity as “an impulsion” which 
suggests more than mere interest, but interest that serves 
as motivation to act. In addition, impulsion must encounter 
resistance. Adversity has the potential to convert experience 
into an experience. This, in outline, is the structure and 
form of every experience. This process of making things 
difficult, of challenging oneself and others, is essential if 
ref lection is to be awakened and take us beyond the merely 
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mundane and routine. “Impulsion from need starts an 
experience that does not know where it is going; resistance 
and check bring about the conversion of direct forward 
action in re-flection; what is turned back upon is the 
relation of hindering conditions to what the self possesses 
as working capital in virtue of prior experiences” (Dewey 
1934, 66). Artists are persons who seek out resistance and 
adversity, accepting new challenges, trying out things that 
are new, exploring new practices, and adapting old ones. 
Thus, exploration or experimentation is characteristic 
of the artist. “There is,” Dewey writes, “a tendency among 
lay critics to confine experimentation to scientists in the 
laboratory. Yet one of the essential traits of the artist 
is that he (sic) is a born experimenter” (Dewey 1934, 
148). Artistic experimentation is the process of trying 
things out. It is manifested in a spirit of adventure, in 
seeking to create new things and new ways of doing 
things. The process has similarities to Donald Schön’s 
(1983) conception of problem solving as “ref lection in 
action.” Schön describes a situation in which teachers have 
“allowed themselves to become confused about subjects 
they are supposed to ‘know;’ and as they have tried to 
work their way out of their confusion, they have also 
begun to think differently about learning and teaching” 
(67). Here we have an instance of an impulsion that 
produces resistance and reflection in which the teacher 
“ref lects on the phenomena before him, and on the prior 
understandings which have been implicit in his behavior. 
He carries out an experiment which serves to generate 
both a new understanding of the phenomena and a change 
in the situation” (68). 
The idea of “allowing” oneself to become confused—
to grasp at the problematic factors in a practice and 
empower oneself to experiment with options, raises some 
difficulties for the practitioner; especially when he or she 
operates in a strictly regulated community of practice. 
Many organizations and professional groups discourage 
innovation and exploration of the type demanded of the 
practitioner artist, limiting creativity and maintaining 
a rigid grip on the scope of individuals’ professional 
judgment. Novelty is equated with heterodoxy and, at 
worst, subjectivity. 
Methodologists claim that “practitioner research” 
lacks objectivity, for how can practitioners possibly 
separate themselves from their interests. Interest is 
equated with lack of objectivity. The idea that someone 
can be both practitioner and researcher, both insider 
and outsider, is tantamount to a contradiction. But the 
conception of the practitioner artists offers an alternative 
view that eschews the goal of an objective outsider in 
favor of a ref lective, critical insider equipped with an 
insider’s understanding and situational awareness and 
furnished with a repertoire of prior experiences to seek 
solutions to practical problems. 
Such a perspective, of course, raises questions 
about the “positionality” of the researcher and attempts 
to ameliorate these “biases” by means of “bracketing” 
aspects of the self so that a degree of objectivity is 
maintained. 
Bias and Bracketing 
In most research endeavors, subjectivity is viewed with 
skepticism and is avoided as a contaminating factor. Even 
in qualitative research, where the researcher is deeply 
imbedded in the work, often as a participant as well as 
observer, there is a sense that researcher assumptions 
and bias need to be named and set aside. Bracketing, 
as the practice is generally known, is described in the 
literature as a means of demonstrating the validity of 
the data collection and analytic processes (Ahern 1999). 
In practice, it involves putting aside “repertoires of 
knowledge, beliefs, values and experiences in order to 
accurately describe participants’ life experiences” (Chan 
et al. 2013, 2). It is part of the “method” of “doing” 
qualitative research and helps to establish the rigor of the 
work. In many ways this seems like a noble task, but this 
practice raises several questions for us as it has for others 
in the past (see Humble and Cross 2010). Bias often lives 
deep below the surface and even the best researchers 
are oblivious to their own biases. The “tenacity of 
unconscious bias” (Gould 1996) makes it unlikely that 
it can be resurrected from the depths, exposed, and 
explored in a useful manner before the study commences. 
Rather, the revelation of bias is likely to dawn slowly over 
the duration of the study or even after it is completed. 
We agree with Ahern (1999), who acknowledges that 
bracketing is a long-term process that is “an iterative, 
reflexive journey that entails preparation, action, 
evaluation, and systematic feedback” (408). Constant 
reflection, reflexivity, and monitoring of emotions and 
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perceptions can be valuable tools in the inquiry process and 
should be part of any inquiry process. At best, we can begin 
to tame our subjectivity by enhancing our awareness of it 
(Peshkin 1991). 
Process, Product, and the Myth of Replication 
Another dualism that often arises in our discussion of 
inquiry or research is the process-product dichotomy. It is 
not unusual to speak of them as separate and distinct, the 
process leads to the product and if we want to replicate 
the product we can simply follow the same process and 
will likely come to the same conclusion. In this scenario, 
as we discussed earlier, following a particular method 
insures a valid outcome and the potential for replication 
is highly valued. But with practitioner inquiry the process 
and product are inseparable, intertwined, and mutually 
reflective. That is, the product is imbedded in the process 
and process is imbedded in the product. Replication is not 
possible because there are too many variables including 
the unique knowledge and skills of the practitioner and 
the practitioner’s relationships with the context and with 
the multiple players involved. More precisely, it is the 
constellation of relationships built over time, within the 
distinctive ever-evolving context that are reflected in the 
process-product1. These cannot be replicated, nor should 
we want them to be, because ultimately it is both the 
uniqueness of the story that the practitioner tells—its 
elements of believability and resonance with the experience 
of his/her readers—that gives the work life. Resonance is 
more important than replication in practitioner inquiry and 
a careful, artful rendering of the process is valuable because 
it constitutes the product, not because it permits someone 
else to replicate it. In Dewey’s terms, situations can be like, 
but not identical. Experience and what Dewey refers to 
as “plasticity”—our human capacity to take what we have 
learned in past situations and adapt them to novel ones—are 
preconditions of the growth of practical understanding. 
All of our EdD cohort members were educational 
professionals. They entered the program with a list of 
accomplishments and a high level of expertise in their 
fields developed over time. They knew the stakeholders, 
had access to multiple sources of information, and were 
sensitive to the complexities of their organizations. It is 
precisely because of their unique set of skills, perspectives, 
and experiences that their studies are valuable to others in 
the profession. Since they engaged their unique strengths to 
seek solutions to practical problems, it stands to reason that 
no one else could enter their situations with the same degree 
of authority to tell the story or have the same degree of 
access to documents and people. Their credibility as central 
players within the organization helped to lend credibility to 
their study. Koch and Harrington (1998), practitioners in 
the field of health, identify “believability and plausibility” 
as goals for interpretive research and as measures of rigor. 
Because practitioners are deeply embedded in their social 
context, they understand the complexity of the unique set-
ting and have the insight to tell a story that is believable and 
plausible and that has resonance for other professionals. 
In conclusion, it is in virtue of the practitioner inquirer’s 
capacity for resonance and plasticity, for their ability to 
adapt past knowledge to new conditions, to modify methods 
to fit novel situations, and to be willing to try things out 
experimentally that we refer to them as artists.
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ENDNOTES
 1 This hyphenated term was inspired by Freire (2000) who used the 
terms “student-teacher” and “teacher-student” to overcome the 
duality of teacher and student. His terms point to the inseparability 
and interdependence of teacher and student and the sense that they 
are mutually informing. 
